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I. 
JURISDICTION 
This court previously dismissed as untimely Eby's appeal of the final judgment 
and his motion to credit settlement proceeds to the judgment in this matter. This court 
lacks jurisdiction over the sole argument raised in Eby's brief that the district court erred 
in denying his motion to be credited with the proceeds of Appellant's ("Lange") 
settlement with Geary Construction, Inc. ("Geary"). Eby's argument is the very argument 
raised by Eby in appealing from the final judgment and could only be raised as part of an 
appeal of the final judgment and not in an appeal from denial of Eby's Rule 60(b) motion. 
II. 
ISSUES 
1. Does this court lack jurisdiction to decide Eby's argument that the district 
court erred in refusing to credit the final judgment against Eby with the proceeds of 
Lange's settlement with another defendant, Geary, because, as this court has already 
ruled, Eby failed to timely appeal the final judgment against him and the denial of his 
motion to credit the proceeds and Eby's argument cannot be raised as part of his appeal of 
the denial of his Rule 60(b) Motion? 
Standard of Review: This court decides its own jurisdiction as a matter of law. 
State v. Todd, 2004 UT App. 266, 98 P.3d 46.1 
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2. If the court decides that it has jurisdiction to decide the settlement credit 
issue and does not strike Eby's brief and summarily dismiss the appeal as Lange has 
requested in her prior motion, did the district court correctly decide that under the 
Liability Reform Act, Utah Code Ann.§ 78-27-37, et seq., Eby was not entitled to have 
the judgment against him credited with the proceeds received by Lange from her 
settlement of her claims against Geary? 
Standard of Review: The district court's denial of a motion for relief from 
judgment under Rule 60(b) is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Birch v. 
Birch, 111 P.2d 1114, 1117 (Utah App. 1989). A district court's alleged erroneous 
decision on a point of law cannot be raised by a Rule 60(b) motion. Fischer v. Bybee, 
2004 UT 92, Tfli 10-12, 104 P.3d 1198. If this Court reaches the legal issue of whether 
the district court correctly determined that Eby was not entitled to have the judgment 
against him credited with the Geary settlement proceeds, that decision would be reviewed 
for correctness. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 92, 93-96 (Utah 1994). 
III. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The determinative statutes in this case are Utah Code Ann. § 15-4-3 (1953) of the 
Joint Obligations Act (the "JOA") and the Liability Reform Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-
27-37, et seq. (the "LRA"). These statutes are set forth in Eby's Appendix. 
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IV. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. On November 6, 2002, Lange filed a complaint against Eby and Geary for 
trespass, negligence, gross negligence, violation of Utah Code Ann. § 78-38-3 and for 
punitive damages against each defendant arising out of their activities in destroying trees, 
bushes, shrubs and other vegetation located on Lange's pristine land located near the 
Weber River in Summit County. [R. 1-8.] Eby hired Geary to perform the road widening 
work. [R. 3; Plaintiffs Exhibit P-3 and P-4.] Eby did not obtain a permit from Summit 
County for this work although he represented to Geary that he did have a permit. 
[Exhibits P10, PI6 and P20.] 
2. In June, 2004, Lange entered into a settlement agreement with Geary 
pursuant to which Geary paid to Lange $140,000 in return for release of all claims against 
Geary and dismissal of the lawsuit against Geary. The settlement agreement expressly 
reserved all of Lange's claims against Eby, reciting that Lange's claims against Eby "are 
not compromised or affected by the agreement." [R. 01223.] 
3. Lange's claims against Eby were tried to a jury commencing July 6, 2004. 
On July 8, 2004, the jury returned its verdict in favor of Lange. The jury determined that 
Lange had suffered damages in the amount of $56,000 and that Eby was 85% at fault. 
The jury determined that Summit County was 10% at fault and Geary was 5% at fault. 
The jury also awarded punitive damages against Eby. [R. 01167-01169.] Judgment was 
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entered against Eby on July 13, 2004, for his proportion of the compensatory damages in 
an amount of $47,750 and for punitive damages. [R. 01163-01164.] 
4. Thereafter, Eby filed a motion to be credited with the $140,000 received by 
Lange from the Geary settlement. Eby argued that because the settlement was far larger 
than the jury verdict, the judgment against Eby had already been fully paid and satisfied 
and that the court should enter a judgment that Eby owes nothing to Lange. [R. 01179-
01192.] 
5. Eby also filed a second motion under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure on the basis that the judgment should not have been entered until after Eby's 
objections to the form of the judgment and his motion to credited with the settlement 
proceeds were determined. [R. 01193-01217.] 
6. By orders dated January 6, 2005, the court denied both motions. [R. 01314-
01319.] 
7. On December 27, 2004, prior to the entry of the orders denying his post-
judgment motions, Eby filed his Notice of Appeal purporting to appeal from the final 
judgment against him and from the denial of the post-judgment motions. 
8. On April 5, 2005, this Court entered its Order Partially Dismissing Appeal 
and Denying Stay, ruling that Eby had not timely appealed the judgment against him and 
the denial of his motion to credit the settlement proceeds and dismissing the appeal except 
that Eby was entitled to proceed with his appeal of the denial of his motion for relief 
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under Rule 60(b) that the judgment had been irregularly entered prior to the expiration of 
the time for making objections. [See Appendix "A".] 
9. The sole argument raised by Eby in his brief is that the district court erred in 
not crediting the proceeds of the Geary settlement to the judgment against Eby. 
IV. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court has already dismissed Eby's appeal from the final judgment and his 
post-judgment motion to alter or amend the judgment to credit him with the proceeds 
received by Lange from the Geary settlement because the appeal was not timely filed. 
The sole argument raised by Eby in his brief is that the district court erred in not crediting 
the settlement proceeds to the judgment. Eby has no right to raise this argument on 
appeal from the denial of his Rule 60(b) motion. That motion was based upon the alleged 
fact that the judgment was entered irregularly before Eby's objections to the judgment 
were decided. Indeed, this court and the Supreme Court have squarely held that Rule 
60(b) cannot be utilized to complain that a district court wrongly decided points of law. 
Even if Eby could raise this issue on his appeal from the denial of his Rule 60(b) 
motion, the district court correctly decided that Eby was not entitled to be credited with 
the proceeds of the settlement. Section 15-4-3 of the JOA has been superceded by the 
comparative negligence provisions of the LRA. Section 15-4-3 only applies where two or 
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more defendants have shared liability. Eby shared no liability with Geary. Rather, under 
the LRA, they were each only liable for their proportionate share of the fault. Eby has 
already had his liability reduced to his proportion of the total fault. He is not entitled to a 
further reduction for the settlement proceeds that Lange received when she settled 
Geary's proportion of the fault. Eby's argument that he is entitled to a further reduction 
of the judgment against him to eliminate any liability based upon Geary's payment would 
result in an enormous windfall to Eby and is totally contradictory to the purpose of the 
LRA which eliminated both joint and several liability and contribution among joint 
tortfeasors. Cases in other jurisdictions have squarely rejected Eby's position. Lange is 
entitled to the benefit of her bargain that she negotiated with Geary. 
V. 
ARGUMENT 
A. EBY HAS NO RIGHT TO RAISE HIS SETTLEMENT CREDIT 
ARGUMENT ON HIS APPEAL OF THE DENIAL OF HIS RULE 60(b) 
MOTION. 
This court previously dismissed Eby's appeal of the final judgment against him 
and the denial of his settlement credit motion on the basis that the appeal was not timely. 
This court ruled that Eby only had the right to appeal from the denial from his motion for 
"relief from the judgment under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure based 
upon alleged irregularities in entering the judgment prior to expiration to the time for 
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making objections." (Order at p. 2.) Lange previously filed a motion to strike Eby's brief 
and to summarily dismiss the appeal because rather than arguing about the supposed 
irregularities in entering the judgment prior to time for making objections, Eby has 
attempted to raise in his brief his argument about the failure of the district court to credit 
the judgment against him with the amount of the Geary settlement, which argument this 
court has already foreclosed by dismissing Eby's appeal of the final judgment and the 
denial of his settlement credit motion. The court has not yet ruled on Lange's motion. 
Lange will therefore briefly discuss this issue. 
As demonstrated in more detail in Lange's motion to strike Eby's brief and 
summarily dismiss the appeal, Eby's Rule 60(b) motion "pertained to procedural and 
clerical mistakes and the need to rule on Mr. Eby's first motion (to be credited with the 
settlement proceeds) before the correct judgment could be known." (Eby Memo, in Opp. 
to Mot. for Sum. Disposition at p. 3.) Eby acknowledged that "[t]he first motion 
requested that the judgment be amended to reflect that Mr. Eby owes nothing to Plaintiff 
for the reasons stated therein (i.e., that Eby was entitled to credited with the amount of the 
Geary Settlement)." Id. Nevertheless, the sole argument made in Eby's brief is that the 
district court committed a mistake within the meaning of Rule 60(b) by refusing to credit 
the proceeds of the Geary settlement in the amount of $140,000 to erase any liability that 
Eby has to Lange under the final judgment. However, this court has already ruled that 
Eby did not timely appeal the district court's refusal to credit the judgment with the Geary 
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settlement proceeds. Eby is not entitled to another bite of the apple on the pretext of 
including his dismissed argument as part of his appeal of the denial of his Rule 60(b) 
motion. 
Eby's only purported justification for arguing about the settlement credit in his 
brief is that: 
The law requires Eby to be credited with Geary's settlement 
payment to Lange [the law in fact has no such requirement]. . 
. . The judgment can be ruled by this Court to be a judicial 
mistake, and that it has been satisfied, discharged, or is void 
as a matter of law. . . [and] [t]his Court can also grant relief 
from the judgment for the reason that it is no longer equitable 
that it should have prospective application and for the 
miscellaneous reasons of subjection (6) of Rule 60(b). (Eby 
Brief at p. 9.) 
Not only is Eby's attempt to argue as part of his appeal of the denial of his Rule 
60(b) motion that the court committed judicial mistake in refusing to credit the proceeds 
of the Geary settlement foreclosed by this court's Order, but it is also foreclosed by the 
Supreme Court's decision in Fischer v. Bybee, 2004 UT 92, 104 P.3d 1198. In Fischer, 
the Supreme Court approved this court's ruling in Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. 
Melvin, 2000 Ut. App. 110, f 22, 2 P.3d 451 which "categorically removed legal error 
from the realm of mistake recognized under Rule 60(b)(1) and "pared back its definition 
of judicial 'mistake' to include only the correction of 'a minor oversight, such as the 
omission of damages, which in most cases would be obvious.'" 2004 UT 92 at \ 11. The 
Supreme Court agreed with the conclusion of the Franklin Covey court that "[i]n sum, 'if 
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a court merely wrongly decides a point of law, that is not [mistake], inadvertence, 
surprise, or excusable negligent.'" Id, at ^  12. [brackets by the court] 
Consequently, even if it were wrongly assumed for purposes of argument that the 
district court erroneously concluded that Eby was not entitled to a credit for the Geary 
settlement, Eby could not raise that alleged error on a Rule 60(b) motion. 
B. SECTION 15-4-3 OF THE JOINT OBLIGATIONS ACT DOES NOT 
APPLY IN THE CASE AT BAR, 
Eby argues at length in his brief that the LRA, Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37, et seq., 
does not supercede Utah Code Ann. § 15-4-3 of the JOA and that Lange would receive a 
windfall if Eby is not credited with the proceeds she received from the Geary settlement. 
These arguments ignore the fundamental change in Utah law effected by the LRA which 
(except for very narrow situations such as vicarious liability) abolished joint and several 
liability and made each defendant liable only in proportion to that defendant's percentage 
of fault. To further reduce a defendant's liability by amounts paid by other defendants to 
settle their percentage share of the fault would be totally inconsistent with the purpose of 
the LRA.1 In fact, it is Eby who seeks to obtain an enormous windfall in this case. 
1
 Eby devotes a good deal of space to reciting general rules of statutory 
construction to attempt to support his argument that the LRA did not affect Section 15-4-
3. (Eby Brief at pp. 17-19.) Eby relies principally upon the Supreme Court's decision in 
Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1318 (Utah 1983). That case does not assist Eby 
because the Supreme Court determined that an existing statute providing that a person 
who was driving under the influence if he or she had a blood alcohol content of .08% or 
greater was inconsistent with the legislature purpose in enacting a new statute making it 
illegal to drive with a blood alcohol content of .10% or greater and therefore the prior 
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Section 15-4-3 of the JOA provides: 
The amount or value of any consideration received by the 
obligee from one or more of several obligors, or for one or 
more of joint or joint and several obligors, in whole or in 
partial satisfaction of their obligations shall be credited to the 
extent of the amount received on the obligations of all co-
obligors to whom the obligor or obligors giving the 
consideration did not stand in relation of a surety [emphasis 
added]. 
This court's interpretation of section 15-4-3 in Jorgensen v. Aetna Casualty & Surety 
Co., 769 P.2d 809, 812 (Utah 1988) disposes of Eby's attempt to utilize that statute to 
escape his liability in the case at bar. In Jorgensen, this court opined: 
[T]he language of Section 15-4-3 expressly limits the 
section's applicability to payments made in "satisfaction of 
their obligations." We find this usage of the word "their" 
indicative of the fact that the drafters had mind only such 
obligations as are shared by the obligors. . . . (Emphasis in 
original.) 
In the case at bar, Geary and Eby did not have any shared obligation. They were 
each only liable to Lange in proportion to their percentage of the fault. The jury 
determined that Eby was 85% at fault, Geary was 5% at fault, and Summit County was 
10% at fault. Lange only settled her claim against Geary for Geary's percentage of the 
statute was impliedly repealed to the extent that it conflicted with the purpose of the new 
statute. That same situation applies here. Section 15-4-3 is inconsistent with the purpose 
of the comparative negligence statutes which make each person only liable for his or her 
own fault. 
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fault. She did not settle Eby's percentage of the fault and expressly reserved her rights 
against Eby. 
Prior to the enactment of the LRA and its abolishment of joint and several liability, 
it made perfect sense to reduce the amount that a plaintiff could recover from non-settling 
defendants by amounts paid by settling defendants toward the shared liability of all of the 
defendants. If a plaintiff settled with one of the defendants for less than the full amount 
of the plaintiffs damages, the plaintiff was still entitled to recover the remaining amount 
of the damages from the non-settling defendants. As among each other, the defendants 
had the right of contribution to equalize their payments toward satisfaction of the shared 
liability. In this context, it was only logical that amounts paid by one settling defendant 
would be credited towards the full amount of the shared liability. 
The LRA changed all that. A plaintiff now settles with a defendant at the 
plaintiffs own risk. If the plaintiff settles with the defendant for less than what a jury 
later determines was the defendant's percentage of fault, the plaintiff is the loser and 
cannot recover the difference from the other defendants. By the same token, if a plaintiff 
settles with a defendant for more than what the jury later determines was the settling 
defendant's share of the fault, the non-settling defendants have no right to credit any 
amount of the settlement towards their separate liability. Further, defendants no longer 
have the right of contribution among each other because they are not jointly and severally 
liable but are only liable for their proportionate share of the fault. Thus, to apply Section 
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15-4-3 of the JO A to further reduce - and in fact eliminate - Eby's liability to Lange after 
Eby's liability has already been reduced to his proportion of the fault would constitute a 
double reduction totally inconsistent with the purpose of the LRA. 
Not surprisingly, Eby has been unable to cite one case which supports his 
misinterpretation of the law. Numerous cases decided in other jurisdictions having 
comparative negligence statutes have rejected his position. 
For example, in Glenn v. Flemming, 732 P.2d 750, 755 (Kan. 1987), the court held 
that a non-settling defendant was not entitled to have the amount of the judgment entered 
against him reduced by the amount paid by another defendant to settle with plaintiff. The 
court held that the rule allowing a pro tanto reduction based on a settlement agreement 
does not apply where "tortfeasors are liable only for proportionate shares of harm", citing 
Restatement (2d) of Torts Section 885(3) comment (a) (1977). The court stated: 
An injured party whose claim for damages is exclusively 
subject to the Kansas comparative negligence statute may 
now settle with any person or entity whose fault may have 
contributed to injuries without that settlement in any way 
affecting his or her right to recover from any other party 
liable under the act. The injured party is entitled to keep the 
advantage of his or her bargaining, just as he or she must live 
with an inadequate settlement should the jury determine larger 
damages or a larger proportion of fault than the injured party 
anticipated when the settlement was reached. [Emphasis 
added.] 
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The Glenn court rejected the cases cited by the defendant on the basis those cases were 
"not persuasive because those cases are from jurisdictions which have not abrogated the 
concept of joint and several liability." Id. at 731. 
In Gemstar Ltd. v. Ernst & Young, 917 P.2d 222, 237 (Ariz. 1996) the Arizona 
Supreme Court held that when a defendant is liable for only his proportionate share, a 
reduction of judgment by the amount of the settlement is unwarranted, observing: 
[R]educing plaintiffs award by the amount of the settlement 
would undermine the policy justifications several only 
liability. Under several only liability, the defendant is liable 
only for the amount of plaintiff s damages that is proportional 
to the defendant's percentage of fault. Thus, offsetting a 
plaintiffs damages by the amount of a non-party's settlement 
is unnecessary because the defendant pays only his share of 
the damages. A contrary rule would (1) give the benefit of an 
advantageous settlement to the non-settling tortfeasor, rather 
than to the plaintiff who negotiated the settlement, (2) 
discourage some defendants from settling in anticipation of 
acquiring the benefits of the settlement of their co-tortfeasors, 
and (3) neglect to recognize the fact that settlement dollars are 
not synonymous with damages but merely a contractual 
estimate of the settling tortfeasor's liability. [Citations and 
internal quotations omitted.] 
To the same effect, see Kriser v. Hobbs, 166 F.3d 736, 742 (5th Cir. 1999) (the court 
refused to credit another defendant's settlement and rejected defendant's argument that he 
was entitled to reduce "its liability for damages twice: first, by the settling defendant's 
share of fault; and second by the amount of that settlement, if greater"); Nilsson v. 
Bierman, 839 A.2d 25, 30-31 (N.H. 2003) (pro tanto credit does not apply when statute 
limited defendant's liability to his proportionate share of damages). 
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Eby repeatedly cites this court's decision in Nelson v. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of 
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 935 P.2d 512 (Utah 1997) to attempt to 
support his position. Nelson is inapposite because it involved vicarious liability, in which 
situation the LRA does not apply. However, the Supreme Court recognized that the LRA 
would supercede or act as &pro tanto repeal of Section 15-4-4 of the JO A with respect 
"regular co-defendants" who are liable because of fault. Id. at 541, n. 3. 
Eby's cry of "windfall" is misdirected. Lange did not receive a windfall. Lange 
settled her claim for compensatory and punitive damages against Geary for $140,000. 
Although it turns out that the settlement may have been more than Geary would have had 
to pay had it tried the case,2 that fact does not equal a "windfall". She bore the risk of that 
settlement, good or bad. Lange simply received the benefit of her bargain with Geary. It 
is Eby who is seeking to obtain an enormous windfall. Eby was found 85% at fault and 
the jury awarded $1,000 in punitive damages against him for intentional and malicious 
conduct. Yet, according to Eby, he does not have to pay one cent because Geary has 
already paid all the damages. Even better for Eby, he faces no claim from Geary because 
the right of contribution was abolished by the LRA. Eby's position is not only in 
irreconcible conflict with the purpose and effect of the LRA, but it would be poor public 
2
 This is not a given because the jury may have awarded very substantial punitive 
damages against a large construction company. Moreover, Lange's experts opined that 
she suffered far greater damages than awarded by the jury, which Geary undoubtedly 
considered in agreeing to the settlement amount. The evidence was that the value of the 
trees destroyed by Eby was alone was more than $100,000. (Exhibit P22.) 
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policy to accept Eby's argument because it would encourage defendants not to pay their 
fair share to settle a case in the hopes that other defendants would pay the liability.3 
Eby incorrectly attaches significance to the fact that Section 75-27-43 of the LRA 
states that nothing in the LRA "affects or impairs . . . statutory immunity from liability." 
However, contrary to Eby's suggestion, Section 15-4-3 has nothing to do with statutory 
immunity but only with crediting a settlement payment made by one or more obligors 
toward an obligation shared by other obligors. 
Eby contends that he and Geary shared an obligation to Lange because Eby and 
Geary were both "at fault for the same loss and destruction of vegetation on Lange's 
property." (Eby Brief at p. 19.) To the contrary, Eby and Lange did not share any 
liability; they were each only liable for their proportion of the fault, unlike the case of 
joint and several liability. Eby was not liable for Geary's conduct and Geary was not 
3
 Remarkably, Eby attempts to escape any liability for his intentional and 
malicious acts by imploring the court that it should not "turn courts into casinos where a 
fully compensated plaintiff can take a risk free throw of the dice for a windfall verdict" 
(Eby Brief at p. 14.) and that "[djisallowing a credit promotes frivolous or greed driven 
litigation by plaintiffs who no longer have suffered any loss." (Id. at 24.) This hyperbolic 
plea egregiously mischaracterizes the issue. Plaintiffs and defendants usually have vastly 
different views on the amount of damages and the proportion of fault of any particular 
defendant. Plaintiffs usually proceed to trial after settling with one defendant because 
they believe they have suffered further damages for which other defendants are 
responsible. The plaintiffs may or may not be right but they will only have the answer 
after the jury returns its verdict. Although Eby is certainly right that the courts are not a 
casino, it is fatuous for Eby to pretend that litigation is not always a gamble. More 
relevant to the case at bar, courts are not the Salvation Army where Eby can hold out his 
hand and reap the benefits of money paid by others. 
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liable for Eby's conduct. That is whole purpose of the comparative negligence statutes 
and the abolishment of joint and several liability. It would make no sense to allow Eby a 
credit for amounts paid by Geary to settle when Eby and Geary were each separately 
liable for their own fault. 
Lastly, it is important to note that Eby does not even attempt to apply the credit 
provided by Section 15-4-3 to the judgment against him in the case at bar. Under Section 
15-4-3 (if it were applicable) the entire payment made by Geary towards its supposedly 
"shared" obligation with Eby would be credited to the judgment against Eby. However, 
obviously recognizing that it would make no sense to apply the statute literally in a 
comparative negligence situation, Eby argues that the amount paid in settlement by a 
settling defendant should be first applied to the settling defendant's proportion of liability 
as ultimately determined by the jury and then any excess settlement amount applied to the 
amounts owing by the non-settling defendants. (Eby Brief at pp. 16-17.) Of course, 
Section 15-4-3 contains no such provision and Eby cites no authority for such a rule. 
Indeed, Eby does not even hazard to come up with a rule as to how the supposed excess 
settlement proceeds are to be allocated to reduce the liability of the non-settling 






For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully submitted that the district court's order 
should be affirmed. 
DATED this the I day of September, 2005. 
BURBIDGE & MITCHELL 
Jefferson W. Gross 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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.Venna M. Swalberg Lange, 
Trustee of the Carl A. 
Swalberg Family Trust, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
David Eby, Geary Construction, 
Inc., and Does 1-10, 
Defendants and Appellant. 
Before Judges Davis, Jackson and Thorne. 
This case is before the court on Appellee Venna M. Swalberg 
Lange's (Lange) motion for summary disposition and on Appellant 
David Eby's (Eby) motion for a stay pending appeal. 
Lange moves to dismiss the appeal on grounds that the 
extension of the time for appeal exceeded the time allowed by 
rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Utah R. 
App. P. 4(e) (limiting extension to 30 days past the original 
appeal period or 10 days after the order granting extension, 
whichever is later). Eby does not dispute that the extension was 
ineffective, but contends that his "Motion to Be Credited with 
Geary Construction, Inc.'s $140,000 Settlement with Plaintiff" 
was equivalent to one or more of the timely post-judgment motions 
that extend the time for appeal under rule 4(b) of the Utah Rules 
of Appellate Procedure. Eby then contends that his notice of 
appeal filed after announcement of the ruling denying the motion, 
but before entry of the signed order, is timely under rule 4(c) 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. However, Lange 
correctly notes that rule 4(c) does not apply to orders ruling on 
any of the post-judgment motions enumerated in rule 4(b). See 
Swenson Assoc. Architects v. State, 889 P.2d 415, 416 (Utah 1994) 
(rejecting application of rule 4(c) to motions enumerated in rule 
4(b), noting "the crucial language of rule 4(c), which provides, 
'Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this rule.'"). 
Although we agree that Eby's motion seeking credit for the 
settlement with Geary Construction is the functional equivalent 
ORDER PARTIALLY DISMISSING 
APPEAL AND DENYING STAY 
Case No. 20050040-CA 
of a motion to alter or amend the judgment under rule 52(b) or 
rule 59(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a notice of 
appeal filed before entry of the signed order disposing of the 
motion was ineffective to confer jurisdiction over the appeal 
from the final judgment against Eby. See Utah R. App. P. 4(b) 
(stating that a notice of appeal filed before disposition of a 
motion to alter or amend the judgment "shall have no effect" and 
"[a] new notice of appeal must be filed within the prescribed 
time measured from the entry of the order of the trial court 
disposing of the motion"). Accordingly, the notice of appeal was 
not timely from the final judgment against Eby, and we lack 
jurisdiction over the appeal insofar as it challenges the 
judgment. 
Eby's second motion sought relief from the judgment under 
rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure based upon 
irregularities in the entry of the judgment prior to expiration 
of the time for making objections. A rule 60(b) motion is not 
one of the enumerated motions under rule 4(b) and "does not 
extend or toll the thirty-day period in which appeals in the 
original action must be filed." Sittner v. Schriever, 2000 UT 
45,121, 2 P.3d 442; see also Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b) ("A motion 
under this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a 
judgment or suspend its operation.") Nevertheless, an order 
denying a rule 60(b) motion constitutes a final appealable order. 
See Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 970 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989) ("It is well-settled under Utah law [that] an order 
denying relief under rule 60(b) constitutes a final appealable 
order."). In addition, the order on a rule 60(b) motion is not 
excluded from the operation of rule 4(c) of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Accordingly, the notice of appeal was 
timely filed after the announcement of the ruling denying the 
rule 60(b) motion and is deemed to have been filed on the date of 
entry of the signed order. The appeal is limited to challenging 
the grounds for denial of the rule 60(b) motion. 
Eby also seeks a stay of the judgment pending his appeal, 
requesting that the stay be granted without the requirement of a 
supersedeas bond. See Utah R. Civ. P. 62(d) ("Upon motion and 
good cause shown, the court may permit a deposit of money in 
court or other security to be given in lieu of giving a 
supersedeas bond."). Lange contends that Eby provided 
insufficient evidence that a judgment lien on his Oakley property 
would constitute adequate security. Under the circumstances, the 
district court did not err in denying the motion to stay, and we 
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also deny the motion to stay the judgment without the requirement 
of a bond. Our denial is without prejudice to renewal of the 
motion to stay in the district court within thirty days of the 
date of this order, provided that, any renewed motion must be 
accompanied by a professional appraisal or analysis of 
comparative sales establishing a market value for the Oakley 
property, along with competent evidence of any and all liens and 
encumbrances on the land. Any evidence submitted in support of a 
motion for stay without a bond is subject to objection by Lange 
as provided in rule 62(g) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
On the basis of the foregoing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to dismiss the appeal 
is granted, in part, and the appeal is dismissed insofar as it 
seeks to appeal the final judgment and any post-judgment motions 
seeking to alter or amend the judgment. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion to dismiss the appeal 
is denied, in part, and the appeal may go forward only insofar as 
it seeks to appeal the denial of the motion for relief from 
judgment under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
and is limited to the grounds asserted in that motion. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion for stay pending 
appeal is denied, without prejudice to renewal of the motion to 
stay in the district court within thirty days of the date of this 
order, provided that, the renewed motion shall fully comply with 
the requirement stated in this order. 
DATED this 5 day of April, 2005. 
FOR THE COURT: 
William A. Thome J r . / J u d g e 
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